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Abstract  
While an extensive body of prior empirical research documents that a firm’s ability to meet 
relevant earnings benchmarks is important to equity and debt investors, there is little evidence on 
whether meeting earnings benchmarks is important to non-investor stakeholders as theory suggests. 
This study examines this issue, focusing on customers. Using both levels and changes analyses on 
a proprietary dataset of customers’ perception scores, we find that individual customers’ 
perceptions are positively associated with a firm’s ability to beat the profit benchmark. This finding 
suggests that, just as creditors use the profit benchmark to infer a firm’s ability to meet its long-
term financial obligations, customers rely on the profit benchmark to infer a firm’s ability to fulfill 
its implied future obligations on products or services. Consistent with this interpretation, the 
positive association between the profit benchmark and customer perceptions is heightened for 
firms in durable goods industries where such obligations are most significant.  Unlike investors, 
customers significantly downgrade their perceptions once a firm exceeds the profit benchmark by 
a wide margin, suggesting that customers may question a firm’s business practices when its profits 
appear to be excessive. We further find that beating the profit benchmark is more important to 
customer perceptions of firms in the introduction or decline life cycle stages and of firms with high 
default risk. On the other hand, beating the profit benchmark is less important to customers when 
firms exhibit superior non-financial performance based on widely publicized ratings of product 
quality, corporate reputation, and corporate social responsibility. These findings highlight the 
contextual nature of customers’ reliance on the profit benchmark. This study provides the first 
empirical evidence on the theoretical prediction that non-investor stakeholders rely on relevant 
earnings benchmarks to evaluate firms.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 An extensive body of prior empirical research documents that a firm’s ability to meet 
relevant earnings benchmarks is important to equity and debt investors’ assessments, as reflected 
in stock returns, credit ratings, and bond yields (Barth et al., 1999; Bartov et al., 2002; Lopez and 
Rees, 2002; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Jiang, 2008). Economic theories and comprehensive surveys 
on CFOs and financial analysts suggest that the importance of beating earnings benchmarks 
extends beyond investors to a broader group of stakeholders (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Bowen 
et al., 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Matsumoto, 2002; Graham et 
al., 2005, De Jong et al., 2014). However, research to date has not examined whether non-investor 
stakeholders such as customers also consider a firm’s ability to meet earnings benchmarks in 
forming and revising their assessments of the firm. We explore this previously unexamined 
theoretical and practical possibility in this study. Specifically, we examine the association between 
a firm’s ability to meet relevant earnings benchmarks and customers’ perceptions of the firm, as 
captured in perception scores generated from surveys of U.S. individual customers. 
Given the economic significance of customers’ contributions1 to the firm, it is crucial to 
understand whether and how they use accounting information. Customers decide whether to buy 
a company’s products or services and at what price based on their assessment of the firm’s ability 
to fulfill its implied commitments (Bowen et al., 1995; Graham et al., 2005; Keh and Xie, 2009; 
De Jong et al., 2014). The conventional view of both academics and managers is that customers 
look to a firm’s accounting performance generally and its ability to meet earnings thresholds 
                                                          
1 Freeman and Reed (1983) argue that, without the support of stakeholders such as customers, employees, and 
suppliers, “the organization would cease to exist” (p.89). “What is Customer? …A Customer is the most important 
person ever in this office-in person, by mail, or by telephone. A Customer is not an outsider to our business-she is a 
part of it. A Customer is not dependent on us-we are dependent on her” (Vaivio, 1999, p.689). When determining a 
firm’s valuation, investors need to examine a firm’s treatment of customers and employees, the two most important 
stakeholder groups (Groening et al., 2016, p.61-62).  
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specifically when making this assessment (Titman, 1984; Bowen et al., 1995; Degeorge et al., 
1999; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Matsumoto, 2002; Habib and Hansen, 2008).2 Although 
many hold this belief, there is little empirical evidence for its validity.  
 Although it is reasonable to assume that the importance of earnings benchmarks to 
investors also extends to non-investor stakeholders such as customers, it is not obvious that prior 
empirical findings that show the importance of earnings benchmarks to investors can be 
generalized to customers. Earnings is designed specifically to facilitate the cash flow forecasts and 
risk assessments relevant to valuing equity and debt claims. However, earnings does not directly 
measure a firm’s performance in areas of specific concern to customers such as product quality, 
price fairness, and corporate social responsibility. Thus, customers may seek other more direct 
measures of performance on these nonfinancial dimensions. On the other hand, customers face 
high information search and processing costs. Because earnings is a convenient summary 
performance measure, customers may avoid these information costs by using earnings benchmarks 
as heuristics to infer a firm’s broader performance (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 
1999; Matsumoto, 2002; Habib and Hansen, 2008).  Given these contrasting possibilities, it is 
essential to test whether prior findings of investors’ use of earnings benchmarks extend to non-
investor stakeholders, especially customers.  
It is important to understand not only whether customers use earnings benchmarks but, if 
so, which earnings benchmarks they prioritize and how they use earnings benchmarks similarly to 
or different from investors. Prior research suggests that the earnings increase benchmark and 
analyst forecast benchmark are most salient benchmarks for shareholders because of their equity 
                                                          
2Survey evidence by Graham et al. (2005) and De Jong et al. (2014) reveal that about 58% of CFOs and 41.2% of 
financial analysts believe that the assurance of a stable business to stakeholders like customers and suppliers is an 
important incentive for firms to meet earnings benchmarks.  
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incentives, and the profit benchmark is the most crucial benchmark for creditors due to their fixed 
claims against the firm. (Bartov et al., 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Lopez and Rees, 2002; 
Brown and Caylor, 2005; Jiang, 2008). Customer claims represent a firm’s explicit and implicit 
warranty obligations, which are similar to debt claims (Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Bowen et 
al., 1995; Jiang, 2008). Given this similarity, customers may, like creditors, prioritize the profit 
benchmark. At the same time, variation in the nature of customer claims may lead to cross-
sectional differences in the importance of the profit benchmark to customers.  
 We obtain proprietary data of customers’ perception scores of firms from Reputation 
Institute, a world’s leading research and advisory firm for reputation, which “conducts the US 
Customer RepTrak® [survey] annually to measure the reputation of the most highly regarded 
customer companies in the United States” (The 2015 U.S. Customer RepTrak®).” Perception 
scores can be used to gauge whether customers view the firm favorably in the areas most relevant 
to them, such as products/services, innovation, citizenship, governance. Much like stock returns 
(credit ratings) in the case of equity (debt) investors, information on customers’ perceptions of the 
firm allows us to examine the importance of earnings benchmarks to customers, a key non-investor 
stakeholder group.  
 We create separate indicator variables based on whether a firm meets or exceeds the 
following thresholds: the profit benchmark, the earnings increase benchmark, and the analyst 
forecast benchmark. For each benchmark, we regress the customers’ perception scores on the 
earnings benchmark indicator, the corresponding earnings controls, and other determinants of 
customers’ perceptions, using both level and change (univariate and multivariate) regression 
analyses. To further explore the underlying mechanisms that drive customers’ interest in earnings 
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benchmarks, we conduct the cross-sectional variation tests on the importance of the relevant 
earnings benchmark to customers. 
 We find that customers’ perceptions are positively associated with a firm’s ability to meet 
the profit benchmark. This finding suggests that, just as creditors use the profit benchmark to infer 
a firm’s ability to meet its long-term financial obligations, customers rely on the profit benchmark 
to infer a firm’s ability to fulfill its implied future obligations on products or services. Consistent 
with this interpretation, the positive association between the profit benchmark and customer 
perceptions is heightened for firms in durable goods industries where such obligations are most 
significant. Customers significantly downgrade their perceptions once a firm exceeds the profit 
benchmark by a wide margin, suggesting that customers may question a firm’s business practices 
when its profits appear to be excessive. Thus, unlike creditors, customers’ reliance on the profit 
benchmark is conditional on their concerns about the firm’s performance on nonfinancial 
dimensions. 
In additional tests of cross-sectional variation, we further find that beating the profit 
benchmark is more important to customers’ perceptions of firms in the introduction or decline life 
cycle stages and of firms with high default risk. On the other hand, beating the profit benchmark 
is less important to customers when firms exhibit superior non-financial performance based on 
widely publicized ratings of product quality, corporate reputation, and corporate social 
responsibility. This latter finding suggests that customers rely less on the profit benchmark when 
there is readily available public information about the firm’s performance on the nonfinancial 
dimensions customers care about. 
 This paper makes a number of contributions. First, it provides empirical evidence on the 
previously unexamined theoretical and practical possibility that non-investor stakeholders – 
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specifically, customers - use earnings benchmarks as focal points in evaluating the status of their 
claims.  
 Second, this study adds to our understanding on customers’ unique use of earnings 
benchmarks. We show that like debtholders, customers prioritize the profit benchmark based on 
their debt-like claims. However, different from investors, customers’ use of earnings benchmarks 
varies depending on the nature of their claims (e.g. whether the goods are durable), firm 
characteristics and on indicators of a firm’s performance on nonfinancial dimensions important to 
consumers.  
Finally, the findings of this paper highlight broader uses of accounting information than 
previously documented, which has significant implications for accounting research. In particular, 
this study demonstrates that customers’ use of earnings information (particularly the profit 
benchmark) provides another incentive for managers to ensure that their firms beat relevant 
earnings benchmarks. This evidence is especially important for managers in firms where customer 
confidence is a critical consideration, as it highlights other key users of accounting information to 
which a firm must be attentive when formulating accounting policies.   
 The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section II discusses related theory, 
relevant literature and develops hypotheses. Section III outlines the research design. Section IV 
discusses the sample and descriptive statistics. Section V describes the empirical results. Section 
VI discusses the robustness check. Section VII concludes. 
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II. Theory and Prior Research 
Firm Stakeholders 
A firm’s stakeholders, who include equity and debt investors, employees, customers, and 
suppliers, provide various forms of necessary support to the firm (Freeman and Reed, 1983; 
Freeman, 1984; Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Clarkson, 1995). Each type of stakeholder assesses the 
status of its monetary and nonmonetary claims on an ongoing basis and decides, based on this 
assessment, whether to continue its support of the company and on what terms. Specifically, equity 
investors decide their willingness to provide additional equity capital and the cost of that capital 
based on the expected amount and riskiness of future cash flows. Debt investors decide their 
willingness to extend additional credit and at what interest rate based on their assessment of the 
firm’s ability to satisfy its obligations. Non-investor stakeholders’ claims include monetary 
components that are similar in nature to debt and equity claims as well as nonmonetary components 
that represent their more qualitative and unique expectations of the company.  
In this study, we focus on one key non-investor stakeholder group, individual customers. 
Customers decide whether to continue buying a company’s products and at what price based 
largely on their assessment of the firm’s ability to fulfill its implied commitments (Bowen et al., 
1995, p.256). Like creditors who need to assure that a firm will survive and satisfy its ongoing 
financial obligation, customers assess a firm’s reputation to honor its implicit claims over the life 
of the products or services (Bowen et al., 1995, Jiang, 2008). 
Customers (Non-Investor Stakeholders) Use of Earnings-Based Heuristics  
As discussed above, stakeholders determine the amount of support they provide to a 
company based on their assessments of the current status of their claims (i.e. a company’s ability 
to meet its commitments). Prior theoretical and empirical research suggests that various groups of 
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stakeholders will use earnings information as part of their assessments of firms. The large amount 
of empirical evidence that stock and bond market returns respond to earnings news highlights the 
importance of earnings to debt and equity investors (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Cheng and Warfield, 
2005; Graham et al., 2005; Jiang, 2008). Although there is relatively scant empirical evidence that 
earnings is important to non-investor stakeholders, such as customers, prior studies theorize that 
earnings is likely to be important to them as well (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Bowen et al., 1995; 
Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al.,1999; Graham et al., 2005). Matsumoto (2002) 
summarizes these theoretical arguments, stating that “[a] firm's other stakeholders—customers, 
employees, suppliers, and so forth—are also customers of its financial information, [and] firm's 
financial image influences stakeholders' assessments of its ability to fulfill its implied 
commitments, leading to more favorable terms of trade with these stakeholders.” (p.491) 
 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) point out that 
stakeholders, particularly non-investor stakeholders such as customers rely on heuristics to process 
earnings information to cope with the cost of “retriev(ing) and process(ing) detailed information 
about earnings for all the firms with which they transact (explicitly and implicitly)” (Burgstahler 
and Dichev,1997, p.123). Specifically, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) 
theorize that stakeholders base their assessments on simple decision rules related to whether firms 
beat relevant earnings benchmarks such as profit, earnings growth, and analyst forecasts. Degeorge 
et al. (1999) additionally theorize that non-investor stakeholders like customers focus on earnings 
benchmarks due to a “threshold mentality,” which reflects the pervasive tendency of humans to 
mentally categorize what they observe. 
Empirical evidence on stakeholders’ use of earnings-based heuristics has focused mainly 
on investors since they represent the primary intended audience for accounting information. In 
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addition, the ready availability of stock returns and bond ratings facilitate the study of investors. 
Specifically, prior studies show that the stock market rewards firms for beating earnings 
benchmarks and that the analyst forecast benchmark is the most important to shareholders (Bartov 
et al., 2002; Brown and Caylor, 2005; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Lopez and Rees, 2002). 
Jiang (2008) provides additional evidence that credit ratings and bond yields are more favorable 
for firms that meet earnings benchmarks and that the profit benchmark appears to be most vital to 
debtholders. 
 Interestingly, prior empirical research has not explored whether non-investor stakeholders 
such as customers also focus on earnings benchmarks even though Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
and Degeorge et al. (1999) raise this theoretical possibility. Practically, the idea that earnings 
benchmarks are important to non-investor stakeholders is widely held by managers and financial 
analysts. Graham et al. (2005) and De Jong et al. (2014) document that 58% of surveyed CEOs 
and 41.2% of financial analysts believe that beating earnings benchmarks is important to assure 
customers and suppliers that the firm’s business is stable. Anecdotally, one customer commented 
on the news of Telsa’s fourth quarterly loss in 2017 that “To clarify, I want Tesla to succeed. I 
want to be able to buy a Tesla in 10 years and not worry about whether or not the company will 
still be around at the end of my warranty period” (Geuss, 2018). This comment indicates that 
customers in the real world are very concerned when a firm loses money and want to ensure that 
the firm will survive long enough to honor its implicit claims related to firm’s products and services.  
 As mentioned previously, with similar debt-like claims as creditors, customers are 
primarily concerned about the firm’s long-term survival and its reputation to honor its future 
implicit claims. Therefore, just as Jiang (2008) finds that the profit benchmark is most salient to 
creditors, we expect customers, like creditors, will prioritize the profit benchmark to form their 
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perceptions when assessing a firm’s stability and its commitments to implied obligations related 
to products or services. Therefore, we propose the following main hypothesis in the alternative 
form. 
H1: Ceteris paribus, beating earnings benchmarks (i.e. the profit benchmark) is positively 
associated with customers’ perceptions of firms. 
 
Variation in the Importance of Earnings Benchmarks to Individual Customers 
 
As discussed above, customer claims are similar to creditor claims, which leads us to expect that, 
like creditors, customers prioritize the profit benchmark. However, customers have other 
nonfinancial expectations of the firm that creditors do not have that may lead to differences in how 
customers and creditors use the earnings benchmark. Moreover, there is substantial variation in 
the nature of customer claims, which could lead to variation in the importance of earnings 
benchmarks to customers. We explore these differences below. 
Customers expect the purchase price to be fair and the firm’s profits to be reasonable. When 
customers believe that a firm has increased prices of products/services “to take advantage of 
surplus demand or newly obtained monopoly power” (Bolton et al., 2003, p.474) without a 
corresponding increase in cost, the high estimate of a firm’s profit will make customers feel 
exploited and increase their perceptions of fair unfairness (Kahneman et al.,1986 a,b; Urbany et 
al.,1989; Frey and Pommerehne,1993; Piron and Femandez,1995; Xia et al., 2004). Thus, 
customers usually have adverse perceptions of the firm that pursues obscenely high profits. 
Therefore, we expect customers to downgrade their perceptions when the firm pursues exceedingly 
high profits after beating the profit benchmark. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis in 
the alternative form. 
H2: After beating earnings benchmarks, the magnitude of earnings is negatively associated with 
customers’ perceptions of firms. 
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The life cycle of a firm also influences customers’ perceptions of the firm. When firms are 
at the life cycle stages of introduction or decline, firms normally suffer from the lack of established 
customers, lack of knowledge about revenues and costs, or declining growth, which may lead to 
concerns about the firm’s viability as a going concern (Dickinson, 2011). Customers are therefore 
more cautious to interact with firms in those life cycle stages than other stage such as growth. 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis in the alternative form. 
H3: Beating earnings benchmarks is more positively associated with customers’ perceptions of 
firms that are in the introduction and decline life cycle stages. 
 
Prior studies show that individual customers pay closer attention to a firm’s ability to fulfil 
its implicit commitments when the firm produces long-term products or when the firm is in durable 
goods industries. In these situations, the useful life (quality) of the products is relatively long 
(important). Therefore, the continuous supply of the products or product related parts are 
particularly crucial to customers. (Bowen et al., 1995; Matsumoto, 2002; Bahadir et al. 2008; 
Chakravarthy et al., 2014). Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis in the alternative form. 
H4: Beating earnings benchmarks is more positively associated with customers’ perceptions of 
firms that have long-term products or are in goods oriented, more specifically, durable goods 
industries. 
 
Jiang (2008) shows that the profit benchmark is more important to creditors as default risk 
increases. Given the previously discussed similarity between creditor and customer claims, we 
expect the importance of the profit benchmark to customers to also be increasing in default risk. 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis in the alternative form. 
H5: Beating earnings benchmarks has more pronounced effects on customers’ perceptions of firms 
with high default risk (high financial distress and volatilities). 
 
In addition to a firm’s financial stability, customers care about a firm’s performance on 
nonfinancial dimensions such as such as product quality, price fairness, and corporate social 
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responsibility. Earnings does not directly measure a firm’s performance in these nonfinancial areas. 
However, because customers may face high information search and processing costs to determine 
a firm’s performance on nonfinancial dimensions, customers may resort to using earnings 
benchmarks as heuristics for this task (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; 
Matsumoto, 2002; Habib and Hansen, 2008).  The need to rely on earnings benchmarks to assess 
a firm’s performance on nonfinancial dimensions may be mitigated when other more direct non-
financial measures are accessible for customers.  
We expect that customers rely less on the earnings benchmarks when highly publicized 
ratings of a firm’s product quality. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis in the 
alternative form. 
H6: Beating earnings benchmarks is less positively associated with customers’ perceptions of 
firms with superior or inferior product quality. 
 
Customers’ confidence in management’s intent and ability to fulfill its commitments is 
greater for firms with high reputations (Hui et al. 2012). Hence, customers may be less reliant on 
earnings benchmarks for firms with higher reputations. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypothesis in the alternative form. 
H7: Beating earnings benchmarks has less pronounced effects on customers’ perceptions of firms 
that are highly influential or reputable. 
 
Similarly, customers’ confidence in management’s intent and ability to fulfill its 
commitments is greater for firms with higher CSR ratings or with greater transparency in the form 
of CSR reports (Ellen et al., 2000; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Lev et al., 2010). Hence, customers 
may be less reliant on earnings benchmarks for firms with higher commitments to CSR. Therefore, 
we propose the following hypothesis in the alternative form. 
H8: Beating earnings benchmarks has less pronounced effects on customers’ perceptions of firms 
that have good CSR performance and CSR disclosures. 
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III. Research Design 
Measuring earnings benchmarks  
 We construct annual earnings benchmarks as three dichotomous variables: the profit 
benchmark (PROFIT), the earnings increase benchmark (INCR), and the analyst forecast benchmark 
(SURP), based on earnings per share (EPS), changes in earnings per share from previous year to the 
current year (CHG_EPS), and the consensus of analyst forecast surprises in earnings per share 
(UE_EPS), respectively. The terms are defined in the Appendix. 
Customers’ perceptions of firm’s reputation  
 To measure customers’ perceptions of a firm (CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION), we obtained 
proprietary annual customers’ perception scores (officially called RepTrakTM Pulse Score) from 
the Reputation Institute (RI hereafter) based on all the RI conducted surveys of U.S. customers 
between 2006 and 2015. Founded in 1997, Reputation Institute is the world’s leading research and 
advisory firm for corporate reputation (Wang et al., 2012). The institute releases an annual 
reputation report for different countries, and in this study, we focus on U.S. companies. In 2015, 
there were 57,746 company ratings generated from 23,750 respondents who were between 18 to 
64 years old. The perception data is collected from online proprietary RI questionnaires around the 
first quarter of each year. The respondents are required to be somewhat familiar with the rated 
companies (i.e. be able to rate the company on at least 4 out of 7 on the Likert familiarity scale) 
and need to be emotionally connected with the rated companies (i.e. be able to rate the company 
at least 3 out of 4 on Pulse statements) (Reputation Institute, 2015). Data is based on a 
representative U.S. sample balanced on Age and Gender distributions. After the data collection, 
RI uses a standardized approach to compute an overall reputation score ranging from 0 to100 for 
each company based on a set of twenty-three key performance indicators. Those indicators are 
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then classified into seven dimensions that are developed from the Reputation Quotient approach 
(Fombrun et al., 2000, 2015): products & services, innovation, financial performance, workplace, 
governance, citizenship, and leadership. A higher overall RI RepTrakTM Pulse score indicates that 
customers perceive the firm more favorably and more reputably.  
Level and Change Regression Models for the Main Hypothesis (H1) 
 We test the impact of beating relevant earnings benchmarks on the customers’ perceptions 
by estimating both level regressions and changes analyses (univariate and multivariate) on the 
pooled sample of firm-years. Additionally, we further control for earnings performance and other 
potential determinants of customers’ perceptions. We estimate equations (1) and (2) using OLS 
regressions with industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered by firm and year.  
 
CUSTOMER_PERCEPTIONi,t+1=ƒ( + BENCHMARKSi,t + EARNINGS_CONTROLSi,t 
                + OTHER_CONTROLSi,t+ ti, )                                 (1) 
 
ΔCUSTOMER_PERCEPTIONi,t+1=ƒ( + ΔBENCHMARKSi,t+ ΔEARNINGS_CONTROLSi,t 
                             + ΔOTHER_CONTROLSi,t+ ti, )                                             (2)      
 
 To capture customers’ perceptions of a firm (CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION), we use the annual 
RepTrak Pulse scores obtained from RI customer surveys, and the change in customers’ perceptions 
(ΔCUSTOMER_PERCEPTION) is measured by its first difference. 
 The earnings benchmarks (BENCHMARKS) take one of the following specifications: The 
profit benchmark (PROFIT) equals one if a ﬁrm’s basic earnings per share before extraordinary 
items is no less than zero and zero otherwise; the earnings increase benchmark (INCR) equals one 
if the change in a firm’s earnings per share before extraordinary items is no less than zero, and zero 
otherwise; and the analyst forecast benchmark (SURP) equals one if the consensus of analyst 
forecast error, defined as the difference between a firm’s actual earnings per share and the most 
0 1 2
3
0 1 2
3
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recent earnings forecast of each analyst, is no less than zero, and zero otherwise. Change in earnings 
benchmarks (ΔBENCHMARKS) equals one if the firm missed the earnings benchmark (the profit 
benchmark, the earnings increase benchmark, or the analyst forecast benchmark) in the previous 
year but beats that earnings benchmark in the current year (MISS_TO_BEAT), and equals negative 
one if the firm beat the earnings benchmark in the previous year but misses that benchmark in the 
current year (BEAT_TO_MISS), and equals zero if the firm has no change in that earnings benchmark. 
 EARNINGS_CONTROLS takes one of the following continuous earnings variables, EPS, 
CHG_EPS, and UE_EPS.  EPS corresponds to the profit benchmark, and is defined as a firm’s earnings 
per share before extraordinary items divided by its stock price at the end of the previous year. 
CHG_EPS, corresponds to the increase benchmark, and is defined as the change in a ﬁrm’s earnings 
per share before extraordinary items divided by its stock price at the end of the previous year. 
UE_EPS, corresponds to the analyst forecast benchmark, and is defined as the consensus analyst 
forecast error, which is computed as a firm’s actual earnings per share minus the most recent 
analyst’s earnings forecast for the current year, divided by its stock price at the end of the previous 
year. ΔEARNINGS_CONTROLSi,t takes one of the following change in earnings variables ΔEPS, 
ΔCHGEPS, and ΔUEEPS , which are the first differences in EPS, CHG_EPS , and UE_EPS, respectively.  
 To test the main hypothesis H1, we use level regressions and change analyses (univariate 
and multivariate). For level regressions, we estimate equation (1) with both basic and complete 
models to test the association between firms’ ability to beat earnings benchmarks and customers’ 
perceptions of the firms. In the univariate analyses, we test the mean and median difference in 
change of customers’ perceptions of firms between the sample that changes earnings benchmark 
status (i.e. from missing to beating (MISS_TO_BEAT) or from beating to missing (BEAT_TO_MISS)) 
and the sample that has no change in benchmark status. To ensure the robustness and alleviate the 
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concern of the omitted variables with the level regression, we further apply the change regressions. 
By estimating equation (2) with both basic and complete models, we examine the effect of change 
in firm’s ability to beat earnings benchmarks on the change in customers’ perceptions of the firms.  
 For each model, we focus on one earnings benchmark. Following Jiang (2008), we also 
add the corresponding continuous earnings variables for each benchmark to control for a firm’s 
financial performance. Similarly, we argue that the coefficient of each earnings benchmark 
represents the average effect of exceeding earnings benchmark on customers’ perceptions 
incremental to firm performance and other potential determinants of customers’ perceptions. In 
addition, we control for various firm’s characteristics that potentially influence customers’ 
perceptions: firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), book-to-market ratio (BTM), R&D expenses 
(RD_EXP), expenses, firm age (FIRM_AGE), additional financial performance (ROA), annual 
industry adjusted buy and hold returns (INDUS_ADJ_RET), Tobins’Q (TOBINS_Q), and the number 
of analysts (N_ANALYST).   
Furthermore, we include additional variables that are unique to customers such as 
advertising (ADS_EXP), sales growth (SALES_GROWTH), number of operating and business 
segments (N_INDSEG), Herfindahl Index (HERF_INDEX), CSR performance (CSR_SCORE), product 
quality (PRODUCT_QUALITY), and firm’s reputation (FIRM_REPUTATION). Details of all the 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Hypotheses for the Cross-Sectional Variations (H2-H8) 
 
 We test the H2 by examining whether customers’ perceptions of firms decline as the 
magnitude of the firm’s earnings increases after passing the relevant earnings benchmarks. 
Specifically, we add to equation (1) an interaction term between the earnings benchmarks and the 
firm’s actual earnings (BENCHMARKS*EARNINGS_CONTROLS), and we estimate the equation (3) 
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below using the OLS regressions with industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are 
double clustered by firm and year.  
CUSTOMER_PERCEPTIONi,t+1=ƒ( + BENCHMARKSi,t + EARNINGS_CONTROLSi,t+ 3  
 BENCHMARKSi,t* EARNINGS_CONTROLSi,t + 4 OTHER_CONTROLSi,t+ ti, )  (3) 
 
Furthermore, in order to show how customers gradually change their perceptions regarding 
the different magnitudes of earnings after firms beat relevant earnings benchmarks, we partition 
the sample (in which firms beat the relevant earnings benchmarks) into four subsamples based on 
the quartiles of firms’ actual earnings. Moreover, to further examine customers’ reactions to firms’ 
actual earnings when those earnings are exceedingly high, we then include additional subsamples 
where firms’ actual earnings are above 80th or 90th percentiles of the whole sample. Finally, for 
each subsample described above, we re-estimate equation (1) with industry and year fixed effects, 
and standard errors are double clustered by firm and year.    
 To test the H3, we discover whether customers will depend more on the relevant earnings 
benchmarks when a firm is at more uncertain or risky life cycle stages. Following Dickinson (2011), 
we develop a firm-level life cycle proxy based on the predictive patterns of cash flows in operating, 
investing, and financing activities across a firm’s various stages of life cycle. Specifically, we 
modify the equation (1) by including the life cycle variable (LIFE_CYCLE), which takes one of the 
following individual life cycle stages: introduction (INTRODUCTION), growth (GROWTH), mature 
(MATURE), shake-out (SHAKE_OUT), and decline (DECLINE). We further add an interaction term 
between the earnings benchmarks and the firm’s various life cycle stages (BENCHMARKS* 
LIFE_CYCLE), and we estimate the following equation (4) using the OLS regressions with industry 
and year fixed effects, and standard errors are double clustered by firm and year.  
CUSTOMER_PERCEPTIONi,t+1=ƒ( + BENCHMARKSi,t + EARNINGS_CONTROLSi,t+  
     3 LIFT_CYCLE+ 4 BENCHMARKSi,t* LIFE_CYCLE,t + 5 OTHER_CONTROLSi,t+ ti, )     (4) 
0 1 2
0 1 2
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 We test H4 and H5 by investigating whether the effect of a firm’s beating the relevant 
earnings benchmark on customers’ perceptions is more pronounced when firms are in specific 
types of industry, and when firms have a high default risk or financial volatility.  
Specifically, to test H4, we partition the sample into subsamples based on three types of 
industry: goods/service oriented industries, durable/nondurable goods industries, industries in 
which firms produce long-term/non-long-term products. Following Bahadir et al. (2008), we 
define service industries with the firms’ primary four-digit SIC codes beginning with 4-9 and 
goods industries otherwise. Similar to Bowen et al. (1995) and Matsumoto (2002), we proxy for 
durable goods industries using the same SIC codes3 they used. Like Chakravarthy et al. (2014), 
we describe industries in which firms produce long-term products by most of Fama-French 48 
Industries they identified4. In addition, for the last two industry types discussed, we further include 
industries with certain SIC codes5 that are closely related to the retail trade of durable products 
with individual customers.  
To test H5, we divide the sample into high/low subsamples based on the firms’ leverage, 
financial distress, and financial volatility. We describe high-levered firms as the firms with median 
or higher debt-to-assets ratio. We capture the firms’ financial distress using the Altman Z-score 
formula (defined in the Appendix), and the firms with median or lower Z-scores are treated as 
financially distressed firms. Furthermore, we define financially volatile firms as the firms with 
median or above stock volatilities. Finally, for each subsample described above, we re-estimate 
the equation (1) with industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are double clustered. 
                                                          
3 Membership in durable goods industries with following SIC codes: 150-179, 245, 250-259, 283, 301, and 324-399. 
4 Those industries are household consumers goods, healthcare, medical equipment and products, machinery, electrical 
equipment, automobiles and trucks, shipbuilding and railroad equipment, aircraft, communication, personal services, 
business services, computers, electronic equipment, banking, insurance, and real estate. 
5 Three-digits SIC codes: 520-527; 530-539; 550-559; 570-573; and 590-599 
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To test H6-H8, we examine whether customers rely less on a firm’s ability to beat relevant 
earnings benchmarks when they are better informed about more direct non-financial measures, 
such as the firm’s product quality, reputation, and CSR engagements. 
Particularly, we test H6 by partitioning the sample into subsamples conditional on firms’ 
different quality of products: overall product quality, product with stronger quality, or product with 
more concerned quality. We treat the overall product quality as ordinary if the total product quality 
scores are between the 25th and 75th percentile of the whole sample. Otherwise, the overall product 
quality is treated as superior or concerned. In addition, we identify the firms’ product quality as 
superior (not superior) when the number of product strengths is greater (less) than the median 
value. Similarly, we classify firms’ product quality as concerned (not concerned) if the number of 
product concerns is greater (less) than the median value.  
To test H7, we divide the sample into high/low subsamples based on the firms’ influence 
(size), diversity, and reputation. We describe firms to be influential when their size is greater or 
equal to the median value. We define well diversified firms as firms with multiple business and 
operating segments (more than the median value). We further identify firms to be highly reputable 
if they are recognized as the American Most Admired (MA) Companies.  
To test H8, we partition the sample into high/low subsamples conditional on the firms’ 
CSR performance, CSR disclosures, and inclusion in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI). 
We define firms with high (low) CSR scores when firms’ KLD ratings are equal to or above (below) 
median. We create a dummy variable to indicate whether firms disclose qualified CSR information. 
Likewise, we have an indicator variable to identify whether the firms are included in the DJSI as 
good CSR performers.  Finally, for each subsample described above, we re-estimate the equation 
(1) with industry and year fixed effects, and standard errors are double clustered. 
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IV. Sample and Descriptive Statistics  
 As discussed above, we obtained the proprietary annual customers’ perception scores 
(officially called RepTrakTM Pulse Score) of rated U.S. companies from the Reputation Institute 
between 2006 and 2015. After imposing the data requirements for all the necessary customer-
related control variables, we have a final sample of 2,544 firm-years for the most basic regression 
model and of 1,719 firm-years for the complete regression model. For all the tests of cross-
sectional variation, we use the complete regression model to test relevant hypotheses. 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the complete 
regression analyses. Based on the 1,719 firm-year observations, customers’ perception scores vary 
from 63.526 (P25) to 72.869 (P75) with a mean of 67.529 (out of 100), and the untabulated min 
and max value of customers’ perception scores are 20.914 and 85.4, respectively. These statistics 
indicate a substantial variation among customers’ perceptions of firms. In addition, many firms in 
the sample are relatively large and have strong abilities to beat the relevant earnings benchmarks 
(the mean for the profit benchmark, increase benchmark, and the analysts’ forecast benchmark is 
0.933, 0.640, and 0.724, respectively). This finding indicates that, consistent with the literature 
discussed above, managers are incentivized/ pressured to beat all the relevant earnings benchmarks. 
In addition, other control variables in the sample, such as book to market, CSR scores, number of 
business segments, Tobins’Q, and number of analysts, also have significant variations, suggesting 
that the sample is relatively representative. 
 Table 2 presents the correlation matrices for major customer-related variables6. Table 2 
shows that a firm’s ability to beat the profit benchmark is significantly positively correlated (with 
a significant level at 1%) with customers’ perceptions of firms. This finding suggests that 
                                                          
6 Due to the space limitation, I only report the main dependent and independent variables and other control variables that 
are most relevant to customers. The major correlation results hold tightly when I include all the variables. 
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customers perceive a firm more favorably when the firm beats customers’ most relevant earnings 
benchmark, the profit benchmark. In addition, almost all the customer-related control variables are 
significantly correlated to customers’ perceptions with the expected signs. Specifically, Table 2 
presents that, as expected, customers’ perceptions of the firm are negatively related to firm size 
and leverage, while positively related to the firm’s R&D expenses, advertising expenses, CSR 
scores, product quality, firm age, firm reputation, and the Tobins’Q. These findings indicate that 
the customers’ perception scores could be reasonably good to capture customers’ real perceptions 
of the firm.  
 
V. Empirical Results 
Regression Results of the Main Hypothesis (H1)  
 Table 3 presents the results of the main level regression analysis. By estimating equation 
(1), we examine the effect of a firm’s ability to beat relevant earnings benchmarks on customers’ 
perceptions. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficients of the profit benchmark are 
significantly positive (  > 0; p < 0.01) in both the most basic and complete regression models. 
This suggests that customers perceive a firm more favorably when it beats the profit benchmark, 
providing support for H1. However, we do not find similar results for other earnings benchmarks, 
echoing the Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)’s point that an earnings decrease may simply reflect 
normal business fluctuation and therefore have little adverse effect on customers’ assessments of 
firms (p.123). Furthermore, the finding that the profit benchmark is the most salient earnings 
benchmark for customers to infer a firm’s reputation to honor its implicit products warranty and 
service commitments, is similar to the argument that debtholders use the profit benchmark to 
assure a firm’s survival to pay back future financial obligations (Jiang, 2008).  
1
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In Table 3, the R2 in the complete regression model is 0.539 which increases dramatically 
from 0.206 in the most basic model, indicating that the explanatory power of the complete model 
increases significantly from that of the basic model. In addition, many control variables have the 
expected signs. For example, the coefficients of (firm size), sales growth, CSR performance, 
product quality, number of business and operating segments, and firms’ reputation are significantly 
(negatively) positively associated with customers’ perceptions. These findings suggest that 
customers positively perceive firms that are socially responsible, diversified, reputable, and firms 
that have good product quality and high sales growth. However, customers dislike big firms which 
could be because big firms are poor at dealing with customers’ complaints (Smith, 2015). 
 Table 4 reports the results of the univariate analysis, in which we examine the impact of 
change in a firm’s ability to beat the profit benchmark on change in customers’ perceptions of the 
firm. As Panel A shows, customers significantly improve their perceptions (with the mean of 2.262) 
when firms go from missing to beating the profit benchmark. Furthermore, the mean and median 
differences in customer perceptions between the two groups (the profit benchmark changes from 
missing to beating vs. no change) are significantly positive (p < 0.01). This suggests that customers’ 
perceptions become more favorable once a firm starts beating from missing the profit benchmark. 
In Panel B of Table 4, there is an obvious reduction in customers’ perceptions when firms start 
missing the profit benchmark; however, the mean and median differences between the other two 
groups (the profit benchmark changes from beating to missing vs. no change) are not significant.  
 Table 5 presents the results of the change regression model. By estimating equation (2), we 
use multivariate analysis to further examine the change effect of beating the profit benchmark on 
the change of customers’ perceptions. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficients of the 
change in the profit benchmark are significantly positive (  > 0; p < 0.01) in both the basic and 1
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the complete regression models with (and without) industry and year fixed effects. This evidence 
provides further support for H1. Additionally, after categorizing the change in the profit 
benchmark into the change from missing to beating (MISS_TO_BEAT) and the change from beating 
to missing (BEAT_TO_MISS), we find that the coefficients of MISS_TO_BEAT are significantly 
positive (p < 0.01) in all models, consistent with univariate analysis results. These findings imply 
that customers’ perceptions are significantly improved when a firm goes from missing to beating 
the profit benchmark.  
 Taken together, we find that like creditors, customers value the profit benchmark more than 
other earnings benchmarks to evaluate a firm’s ability to fulfill its implied future commitments. 
Furthermore, customers improve their perceptions when firms start beating from missing the profit 
benchmark, and they are more forgiving than investors when firms start missing from beating the 
profit benchmark. 
Regression Results of Hypotheses for the Cross-Sectional Variations (H2-H8)  
 We further conduct cross-sectional variation tests to examine whether the effect of beating 
the profit benchmark on consumers’ perceptions varies among specific earnings’ or firms’ 
characteristics, such as the magnitude of earnings and firms’ life cycle.  
Specifically, in Table 6, by estimating equation (3), we examine the effects of firm’s 
earnings magnitude after beating the profit benchmark on customers’ perceptions. Consistent with 
our expectations, the coefficient of the interaction term between the profit benchmark and the firms’ 
actual earnings in column (1) of Table 6 is significantly negative ( 3  > 0; p < 0.01). In addition, 
column (2)-(7) of Table 6 show that the after firms beat the profit benchmark, the customers’ 
perceptions monotonically decrease from significantly positive all the way to significantly 
negative when the level of profitability monotonically increases from low to exceedingly high (0 
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to 25th percentiles (low) to 90th percentiles above (very high) of the firms’ actual earnings). This 
means that customers downgrade their perceptions of firms when the magnitude of the firm’s 
earnings increases to very high after beating its profit benchmark, providing support for H2. The 
finding further indicates that excessive earnings, which could cause customers serious concerns 
about price fairness, does not enhance but instead damages customers’ perceptions once the profit 
benchmark has been met. Thus, unlike shareholders who are profit seekers, customers appear more 
to be satisficers with respect to firms’ accounting, and more specifically, earnings performance. 
In Table 7, we estimate equation (4) to investigate the effects of a firm’s ability to beat the 
profit benchmark on customers’ perceptions conditional on various stages of a firm’s life cycle, 
introduction, growth, mature, shake-out, and decline. As we expected, the coefficients of the 
interaction term between the profit benchmark and individual life cycle stage, introduction and 
decline, are significantly positive (
4  > 0; p < 0.05) in column (1), (5) and (6) of Table 7. 
Interestingly, we also find that the coefficient of the interaction term between the profit benchmark 
and the growth stage is significantly negative in column (2) of Table 7; however, this effect 
becomes insignificant when putting all the life cycle and interaction terms together. The finding 
indicates that customers tend to use earnings information differently at the various stages of a 
firm’s life cycle. Specifically, they rely more (less) of the profit benchmark when the firm is at the 
life cycle stage of introduction or decline (growth), which provides support for H3. One possible 
explanation is that customers are more concerned about a firm when its life cycle involves greater 
uncertainty and are short of customers/operating experience than other stages such as growth.  
In other cross-sectional tests, by re-estimating equation (1) in different subsamples, we 
further examine whether the effect of beating the profit benchmark on customers’ perceptions is 
more pronounced for firms that are in specific industry types and for firms with potential financial 
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default risks. In Panel A of Table 8, consistent with our predictions, we find that the coefficients 
of the profit benchmark are significantly positive (  > 0; p < 0.05) when firms are in goods-
oriented industries, durable goods industries, and industries in which firms produce long-term 
products. Because the useful life (quality) of the products is relatively long (important), the firms’ 
continuous supply of the products or product related parts are particularly crucial to customers. As 
the findings show, customers are incentivized to rely more on the profit benchmark to imply the 
firm’s future implied warranty and service commitments related to durable or long-term products, 
supporting for H4. This further echoes the point of made by an interviewed CFO, who worked in 
an industry in which confidence of retail customers is a significantly important, that “concerns 
about the stakeholder hypothesis is a significant determinant of the accounting and disclosure 
decisions” (Graham et al., 2005, p.27).    
Consistent with our expectations, the coefficients of the profit benchmark in Panel B of 
Table 8 are significantly positive (  > 0; p < 0.05) when firms are with high leverage (high debt 
to assets ratio), high financial distress, and high stock volatilities. Malshe and Agarwal (2015) 
shows that financial leverage leads to lower customer satisfaction, and part of the reason is because 
like creditors, customers are more seriously concerned about a firm’s survival and stability when 
the default risk and the financial volatility are high. Therefore, as the results show, customers are 
motivated to rely more heavily on the profit benchmark to infer the firm’s reputation to honor its 
implicit claims related to products/services when the firm is at risk of these financial instabilities, 
which provides support for H5. This finding is similar to Jiang’s (2008) finding that creditors use 
more of the profit benchmark to assess firms’ ability to pay off its future financial obligations when 
firms have high default risk. 
1
1
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In contrast, we also investigate whether a firm’s ability to beat the profit benchmark is less 
important to customers when they are better informed by other more direct non-financial measures, 
such as the firm’s product quality, reputation, and CSR engagements.  
As expected, in Panel A of Table 9, we find that the coefficients of the profit benchmark 
are significantly positive (  > 0; p < 0.05) when the firms’ product quality is overall ordinary, 
not superior, or not concerned (inferior). This suggests that customers rely more on the profit 
benchmark to evaluate firms when the product quality is just normal or ordinary to customers; 
however, when customers are better aware of the product quality features, either superior or 
concerned, they tend to rely less on the profit benchmark to form firm perceptions. This evidence 
provides support for H6. One possible explanation is that the quality of products is one of the most 
important and direct factors for customer to make purchase decisions, and thus customers may pay 
less attention to other factors once they are better informed about the product quality features.  
In Panel B of Table 9, the results are consistent with our expectations. Specifically, we find 
that the coefficients of the profit benchmark are significantly positive (  > 0; p < 0.01) when the 
firms are less influential, less diversified, or less reputable (firms are not MA companies). This 
finding indicates that customers rely more on the profit benchmark to assess firms if the firms are 
not famously known for their influence (size), diversification, or reputation. However, after 
customers are aware of those firms’ characteristics, firms are more likely to be viewed as the 
respected/admired firms. Customers therefore are more forgiving and less concerned about the 
firms’ ability to beat the profit benchmark. This finding provides support for H7.  
Consistent with our expectations, the coefficients of the profit benchmark in Panel C of 
Table 9 are significantly positive (  > 0; p < 0.01) when the firms have relatively low CSR scores 
(KLD ratings), don’t disclose qualified CSR reports, or are not included in the DJSI. This suggests 
1
1
1
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that customers rely more on the profit benchmark to evaluate firms when firms are not recognized 
as well-known socially responsible firms. However, when firms actively engage in CSR 
commitments (i.e. with high KLD ratings, disclosing CSR reports on GRI, or being included in 
DJSI), customers are less motivated to use the profit benchmark to assess firms’ reputation to 
honor its implicit related claims. This provides support for H8. One possible reason could be 
because CSR active firms are normally regarded as trustful and responsible firms, and therefore 
customers are more likely to generate favorable product assessments and greater resilience to 
negative events of those firms (Ellen et al., 2000; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Lev et al., 2010).  
 
VI. Robustness Checks 
To ensure the robustness of the results, we exclude public utilities (two-digit SIC code 49) 
and ﬁnancial service ﬁrms (two-digit SIC codes between 60 and 67) due to the regulatory features 
of these industries. After we rerun all the analyses, the results are very robust for all the main and 
cross-sectional tests. 
As another robustness test, we use an alternative proxy, customers’ satisfaction scores, to 
capture our main dependent variable, customers’ perceptions. We hand collected the customers’ 
satisfaction scores of each available company from the American Customer Satisfaction Index 
(ACSI). After re-estimating the equations, we find that the coefficients of the profit benchmark are 
still significantly positive (  > 0; p < 0.01) for the main tests. This indicates that both customers’ 
perception scores from RI and customers’ satisfaction scores from ACSI are potentially good 
measures to proxy for customers’ real perceptions of the firms.  
 Furthermore, we conduct several additional tests (untabulated) to examine the sensitivity 
of the results. For both main and cross-sectional tests, we estimate all equations and run all the 
1
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subsample tests using different measures for existing control variables (i.e. size, book to market, 
leverage), or replacing existing control variables with other relevant variables such as quick ratio, 
operating cash flow, stock volatility, with/without industry and year fixed effect. In addition, we 
put all the earning benchmarks and earnings controls together in one regression with firm and year 
fixed effects, and double clustered the standard errors. All of results hold tightly in the cases 
discussed above. In the future, in addition to the existing change regressions reported in the paper, 
we will use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to further control for unobservable factors 
that may influence the results.  
 
VII. Conclusion  
 Prior academic theories, managers’ beliefs, and anecdotal evidence all suggest that non-
investor stakeholders also use earnings benchmarks to determine the level of support they provide 
to a firm. In this paper, we investigate whether a firm’s ability to beat relevant earnings benchmarks 
influences non-investor stakeholders’ and more specifically customers’ perceptions of firms. We 
measure customers’ perceptions using a proprietary dataset of customers’ perception scores from 
the RI, and we find that individual customers’ perceptions are positively associated with a firm’s 
ability to beat the profit benchmark. More interestingly, we find that the way customers rely on 
the profit benchmark is contextually dependent on customers’ implicit claims with the firm. 
 Specifically, with similar debt-like claims as creditors, customers rely on the profit 
benchmark to infer a firm’s ability to fulfill its implied future obligations on products or services. 
However, unlike investors, customers significantly downgrade their perceptions once the firm’s 
earnings largely exceeds the profit benchmark. In the tests of cross-sectional variation, we further 
find that customers rely more on the profit benchmark when the firm is in durable goods industries, 
29 
 
when the firm is in the life cycle stages of introduction or decline, and when the firm is under high 
default risk. On the other hand, customers have greater tolerance than investors for a firm’s ability 
to beat the profit benchmark when the firm has more direct non-financial measures such as superior 
or inferior product quality, the most admired reputation, and good CSR engagements. 
 This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this paper presents empirical 
evidence that validates the unexamined theoretical prediction that non-investor stakeholders, and 
individual customers in particular, use earnings benchmarks to evaluate the status of their claims. 
Second, this study adds to our understanding on how customers use earnings benchmarks similar 
to and different from investors in evaluating a firm’s performance conditional on customers’ 
unique claims. Finally, the findings of this paper highlight broader uses of accounting information 
than previously documented, which has significant implications for accounting research. 
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Appendix. Variable Definitions7 
 
                                                          
7 All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
Variables  Definitions 
Main Dependent Variables: Non-investor Stakeholders’ Perception of Firms  
CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
The annual overall reputation scores of companies in the customer survey 
generated by the Reputation Institute 
ΔCUSTOMER_PERCEPTION The first difference in CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
 
Main Independent Variables: Earnings Benchmarks  
PROFIT 
A dummy variable which equals one if a ﬁrm’s basic earnings per share 
before extraordinary items is no less than zero, and zero otherwise 
INCR 
A dummy variable which equals one if changes in a ﬁrm’s earnings per 
share before extraordinary items is no less than zero, and zero otherwise 
SURP 
A dummy variable which equals one if the consensus of analyst forecast 
error, the difference between a firm’s actual earnings and the most recent 
earnings forecast of each analyst, is no less than zero, and zero otherwise 
ΔPROFIT 
A variable which equals one if a firm missed the profit benchmark in the 
previous year but beats it in the current year, and equals negative one if a 
firm beat it in the previous year but misses it in the current year, and equals 
zero if a firm has no change in the profit benchmark 
ΔINCR 
A variable which equals one if a firm missed the increase benchmark in the 
previous year but beats it in the current year, and equals negative one if a 
firm beat it in the previous year but misses it in the current year, and equals 
zero if a firm has no change in the increase benchmark 
ΔSURP 
A variable which equals one if a firm missed the analyst forecast benchmark 
in the previous year but beats it in the current year, and equals negative one 
if a firm beat it in the previous year but misses it in the current year, and 
equals zero if a firm has no change in that benchmark 
MISS_TO_BEAT 
A firm missed the earnings benchmarks in the previous year but beats it in 
the current year 
BEAT_TO_MISS 
A firm beat the earnings benchmarks in the previous year but misses it in the 
current year 
Earnings Controls 
EPS 
A firm’s earnings per share before extraordinary items in the current year 
divided by its stock price at the end of the previous year; corresponds to the 
profit benchmark 
CHG_EPS 
The changes in a ﬁrm’s earnings per share before extraordinary items from 
the previous year to the current year, divided by its stock price at the end of 
the previous year; corresponds to the increase benchmark 
UE_EPS 
The consensus of analyst forecast error, defined as the difference between 
ﬁrm’s actual earnings per share and the most recent analyst’s earnings 
forecast for the current year; corresponds to analyst forecast benchmark  
ΔEPS The first difference in EPS 
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ΔCHGEPS The first difference in CHG_EPS 
ΔUEEPS The first difference in UE_EPS 
Other Controls 
ROA 
A firm’s income before extradentary items in the current year deflated by 
total assets at the beginning of the current year 
SIZE The natural log of a firm’s total assets at the end of the current year 
LEV 
A firm’s total liabilities divided by total assets at the beginning of the current 
year 
BTM 
The natural log of a firm’s book value of equity divided by its market value 
of equity, both measured at the end of the current year, following Jiang 
(2008, 384) 
RD_EXP 
A firm’s research and development expense in the current year deflated by 
total assets at the end of the current year 
ADS_EXP 
A firm ’s advertising expense in the current year deﬂated by total assets at 
the end of the current year 
CSR_SCORE 
A firm’s net KLD ratings of strengths and concerns on all the six dimensions 
(not including the product dimension) at the end of the current year 
PRODUCT_QUALITY 
A firm’s net KLD ratings of strengths and concerns only on the product 
dimension at the end of the current year 
FIRM_AGE 
The natural log of a firm’s lifetime, defined as the number of month from the 
firm’s IPO date (or first date listed on CRSP if IPO date is missing) to the 
current date  
N_ANALYST The number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for a firm during the year  
HERF_INDEX 
The sum of squared market shares of a firm within the industry (two-digit 
SIC code) during the current year 
N_SEGMETNS The number of business and operational segments of a firm at the end of the 
current year 
SALES_GROWTH A firm’s revenue changes from the previous year to the current year divided 
by its revenue in the previous year 
INDUS_ADJ_RET A firm’s industry adjusted buy and hold returns based on monthly stock 
return data 
FIRM_REPUTATION A dummy variable which equals one if the firm is identified as the 
American Most Admired (MA) Company, and zero otherwise 
TOBINS_Q “Tobins’ Q is equal to the natural log of market value of assets divided by the 
book value of assets (AT), where the market value of assets is computed as 
the market value of common stock (PRCC_F*CSHO), plus the book value of 
debt, which is calculated as total assets (AT) less the sum of book value of 
common stock (CEQ) and balance sheet deferred taxes (TXDB),” following 
Christensen (2016, p398) 
Altman Z-score Z_score model defined by Altman (1968, 2000). 
Z=1.2X1+1.4X2+3.3X3+0.6X4+0.999X5  
where  X1 = working capital/total assets; X2 = retained earnings/total assets 
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets; X4 = market value 
equity/book value of total liabilities; X5 = sales/total assets 
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TABLE 1 
 
  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the regression analyses; All 
continuous variables have been winsorized by year at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. See 
Appendix for variable definitions.  
   
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables 
Variables N Mean Std P25 Median P75 
CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 1719 67.529 7.720 63.526 68.254 72.869 
PROFIT 1719 0.933 0.250 1.000 1.000 1.000 
INCR 1719 0.640 0.480 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SURP 1716 0.724 0.447 0.000 1.000 1.000 
EPS 1719 0.043 0.393 0.045 0.063 0.083 
CHG_EPS 1719 -0.012 0.376 -0.018 0.001 0.015 
UE_EPS 1716 0.001 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.002 
SIZE 1719 10.170 1.385 9.190 10.163 10.981 
LEV 1719 0.692 0.222 0.541 0.670 0.832 
ROA 1719 0.067 0.065 0.027 0.059 0.101 
BTM 1719 0.475 0.426 0.211 0.382 0.656 
RD_EXP 1719 0.018 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.021 
ADS_EXP 1719 0.019 0.031 0.000 0.003 0.025 
CSR_SCORE 1719 2.831 4.096 0.000 2.000 5.000 
PRODUCT_QUALITY 1719 -0.482 1.066 -1.000 0.000 0.000 
FIRM_AGE 1719 5.874 0.854 5.384 5.974 6.594 
HERF_INDEX 1719 0.084 0.089 0.032 0.046 0.089 
SALES_GROWTH 1719 0.057 0.149 -0.009 0.048 0.103 
INDUS_ADJ_RET 1719 -0.008 0.325 -0.168 -0.006 0.159 
N_INDSEG 1719 3.387 1.920 2.000 3.000 5.000 
FIRM_REPUTATION 1719 0.561 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000 
TOBINS_Q 1719 0.504 0.464 0.121 0.402 0.804 
NUM_ANALYSTS 1719 11.759 7.931 5.000 10.000 17.000 
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TABLE 2 
 
  Correlations 
 
Table 2 reports correlations for the major customer-related variables8 in the sample. Spearman correlation coefficients (above the diagonal) and 
Pearson coefficients (below the diagonal) for main customer variables used in our primary analyses are reported. Correlations that are significant at 
the 5% level or better are presented in bold. All continuous variables have been winsorized by year at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. See 
Appendix for variable definitions.  
 
Correlation Matrices for Major Customer-Related Variables 
                                                          
8 Due to the space limitation, I only report the main dependent and independent variables and other control variables that are most relevant to customers. The 
major correlation results hold tightly when I include all the variables 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION  0.08 0.01 0.04 -0.24 -0.11 0.28 0.37 0.24 0.29 0.14 0.10 0.40 0.00 
(2) PROFIT 0.07  0.19 0.12 0.08 -0.10 0.06 -0.05 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.07 
(3) INCR 0.02 0.19  0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.00 
(4) SURP 0.04 0.12 0.09  0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.01 
(5) SIZE -0.27 0.06 0.00 0.01  0.17 0.06 -0.33 0.17 -0.36 0.20 0.37 -0.32 0.35 
(6) LEV -0.08 -0.12 0.01 -0.04 0.20  -0.16 -0.18 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.23 0.09 
(7) RD_EXP 0.20 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.18  0.11 0.30 0.01 0.29 0.14 0.42 0.16 
(8) ADS_EXP 0.28 -0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.32 -0.12 0.01  0.14 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.41 -0.20 
(9) CSR_SCORE 0.29 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.14 -0.10 0.33 0.11  0.11 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.08 
(10) PRODUCT_QUALITY 0.32 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.36 -0.06 -0.04 0.09 0.12  -0.06 -0.15 0.10 -0.09 
(11) FIRM_AGE 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.15 -0.13 0.12 0.01 0.16 -0.06  0.15 0.06 0.27 
(12) FIRM_REPUTATION 0.07 0.15 0.03 0.08 0.35 -0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.16 -0.14 0.14  0.21 0.12 
(13) TOBINS_Q 0.31 0.16 0.10 0.07 -0.34 -0.17 0.36 0.37 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.17  -0.10 
(14) N_INDSEG 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.37 0.07 -0.04 -0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.24 0.12 -0.10  
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TABLE 3 
 
The Effects of Beating Earnings Benchmarks on Customers’ Perceptions of Firms 
 
Table 3 reports the main level regression results. By estimating equation (1), we test H1 in both basic and 
more complete regression models. CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION is the dependent variable. Columns (1)-(2) 
show results for the profit benchmark (PROFIT). Columns (3)-(4) show the results for increase benchmark 
(INCR). Column (5)-(6) show results for the analysts’ forecast benchmark (SURP). Both industry and year 
fixed effects are included in the more complete models. All variables are defined in the Appendix. p-values 
in parentheses are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
VARIABLES Profit Benchmark Increase Benchmark Analysts’ Forecast Benchmark 
       
PROFIT 1.819*** 1.753*** 
    
 
(0.000) (0.007) 
    
EPS 2.422*** 2.346*** 
    
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
    
INCR 
  
0.243 0.135 
  
   
(0.411) (0.672) 
  
CHG_EPS 
  
1.723*** 2.343*** 
  
   
(0.000) (0.000) 
  
SURP 
    
  0.280 0.058 
     
(0.383) (0.883) 
UE_EPS 
    
-13.877** -14.579** 
     
(0.049) (0.024) 
SIZE -1.256*** -0.817*** -1.234*** -0.825*** -1.159*** -0.951*** 
 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) 
LEV 0.442 0.738 -0.014 0.622 0.162 1.140 
 
(0.464) (0.509) (0.982) (0.572) (0.793) (0.339) 
BTM -0.283 -0.273 -0.349 -0.239 -1.287*** -0.140 
 
(0.239) (0.752) (0.148) (0.784) (0.000) (0.882) 
RD_EXP 40.980*** 0.387 39.569*** 0.315 35.482*** 3.035 
 
(0.000) (0.973) (0.000) (0.979) (0.000) (0.805) 
ADS_EXP 46.603*** 14.293 45.387*** 12.879 44.126*** 11.780 
 
(0.000) (0.126) (0.000) (0.159) (0.000) (0.187) 
FIRM_AGE 1.035*** 0.766 1.110*** 0.770 0.977*** 0.695 
 
(0.000) (0.117) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.145) 
SALES_GROWTH 0.638 2.671*** 0.663 2.405*** 0.203 0.576 
 
(0.454) (0.004) (0.440) (0.007) (0.819) (0.685) 
       
(Continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
 
CSR_SCORE 
 
0.337*** 
 
0.337*** 
 
0.340*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
PRODUCT_QUALITY 
 
1.222*** 
 
1.237*** 
 
1.262*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
ROA 
 
-13.465*** 
 
-7.957** 
 
-3.654 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.340) 
HERF_INDEX 
 
-4.804 
 
-5.225 
 
-5.243 
  
(0.542) 
 
(0.503) 
 
(0.486) 
INDUS_ADJ_RET 
 
-0.433 
 
-0.456 
 
-0.034 
  
(0.139) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.926) 
N_INDSEG 
 
0.326** 
 
0.327** 
 
0.365** 
  
(0.022) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.014) 
FIRM_REPUTATION 
 
0.860** 
 
0.989** 
 
1.123*** 
  
(0.029) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.009) 
TOBINS_Q 
 
1.817* 
 
1.502 
 
1.124 
  
(0.074) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.284) 
N_ANALYSTS 
 
0.009 
 
0.012 
 
0.020 
  
(0.837) 
 
(0.789) 
 
(0.658) 
CONSTANT 70.739*** 48.074*** 72.071*** 49.680*** 72.519*** 51.067*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Industry and Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Cluster by Firm & Year No Yes No  Yes No Yes 
Observations 2,544 1,719 2,544 1,719 2,436 1,716 
R-squared 0.206 0.539 0.193 0.535 0.187 0.524 
Adjusted R-squared 0.204 0.516 0.190 0.511 0.184 0.500 
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TABLE 4 
 
   The Change Effects of Beating the Profit Benchmark on Customers’ Perceptions of Firms:  
                                                          Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the univariate analysis, in which we examine the effects of change in 
the profit benchmark on the change in customers’ perceptions of firms. The mean and median of change 
in customers’ perceptions of firms (ΔCUSTOMER_PERCEPTION) are reported as whether the profit 
benchmark goes from missing to beating (ΔPROFIT=1), from beating to missing (ΔPROFIT= -1), or 
no change (ΔPROFIT = 0). Panel A shows the comparison between the profit benchmark going from 
missing to beating and no change. Panel B presents the comparison between the profit benchmark going 
from beating to missing and no change. All variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
    
 
Panel A: Profit Benchmark Goes from Missing to Beating and No Change 
 
VARIABLES ΔPROFIT = 1  ΔPROFIT = 0  Difference P-Value 
ΔCONSUMER_PERCEPTION 
2.262 0.622 1.640*** 0.001 
(Mean) 
ΔCONSUMER_PERCEPTION 
0.662 0.492  0.170*** 0.004 
(Median) 
                
                  
 
 Panel B: Profit Benchmark Goes from Beating to Missing and No Change 
 
VARIABLES ΔPROFIT = -1  ΔPROFIT = 0  Difference P-Value 
ΔCONSUMER_PERCEPTION 
0.452 0.707 0.255 0.602 
(Mean) 
ΔCONSUMER_PERCEPTION 
0.497 0.550 0.053  0.357 
(Median) 
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TABLE 5 
 
 The Change Effects of Beating the Profit Benchmark on Customers’ Perceptions of Firms:  
Multivariate Analysis 
Table 5 reports the results for the multivariate analysis. By estimating equation (2), we examine the 
change effects of beating the profit benchmark on customers’ perceptions of firms in both basic and more 
complete regression models. This analysis further tests H1 by alleviating the concern of the omitted 
variables associated with level regressions. ΔCUSTOMER_PERCEPTION is the dependent variable. 
Columns (1)-(3) show the results when the profit benchmark changes (ΔPROFIT). Column (4)-(6) show 
the results when the profit benchmark goes from missing to beating (MISS_TO_BEAT) and from beating 
to missing (BEAT_TO_MISS). p-values in parentheses are calculated using standard errors clustered by 
firm and year.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔCUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
VARIABLES 
Change Status on the Profit 
Benchmark 
Change from Miss to Meat or Beat to 
Miss        
ΔPROFIT 0.875*** 1.025*** 1.056***    
 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.010)    
MISS_TO_BEAT    1.707*** 1.929*** 2.211***  
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BEAT_TO_MISS    -0.085 -0.193 -0.005  
   (0.857) (0.704) (0.991) 
ΔEPS -0.104 -0.051 -1.124 -0.114 -0.062 -1.365  
(0.654) (0.834) (0.476) (0.623) (0.799) (0.419) 
ΔSIZE 0.280 0.552 0.522 0.655 0.988 1.032***  
(0.723) (0.533) (0.215) (0.416) (0.274) (0.002) 
ΔLEV -0.080 -0.470 -0.828 -0.338 -0.734 -1.209  
(0.915) (0.559) (0.383) (0.655) (0.366) (0.189) 
ΔBTM -0.710** -0.663** -0.558 -0.745*** -0.730** -0.600  
(0.013) (0.035) (0.212) (0.009) (0.021) (0.197) 
ΔRD_EXP -21.871 -22.934 -25.884 -21.802 -22.569 -26.069  
(0.127) (0.118) (0.147) (0.127) (0.124) (0.129) 
ΔADS_EXP 12.030 14.807 23.516*** 11.797 14.493 23.921***  
(0.476) (0.395) (0.001) (0.484) (0.404) (0.001) 
ΔFIRM_AGE -0.820 -0.155 -2.000 -0.927 -0.397 -2.531**  
(0.381) (0.936) (0.123) (0.322) (0.837) (0.042) 
ΔSALES_GROWTH 0.226 0.309 0.063 0.248 0.348 0.135  
(0.651) (0.571) (0.930) (0.620) (0.523) (0.853) 
       
 (Continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
ΔINDUS_ADJ_RET  -0.277 -0.177  -0.297 -0.222 
  (0.212) (0.588)  (0.179) (0.481) 
Δ N_INDSEG  0.307* 0.310  0.301* 0.315 
  (0.051) (0.172)  (0.056) (0.153) 
ΔHERF_INDEX 
 
-7.214 -13.721 
 
-7.226 -13.699 
  
(0.187) (0.429) 
 
(0.186) (0.431) 
ΔCSR_SCORE 
  
0.119* 
  
0.119* 
   
(0.086) 
  
(0.087) 
ΔPRODUCT_QUALITY 
  
0.182* 
  
0.196* 
   
(0.076) 
  
(0.069) 
ΔROA 
  
-0.363 
  
0.159 
   
(0.944) 
  
(0.974) 
ΔFIRM_REPUTATION 
  
-0.063 
  
-0.023 
   
(0.820) 
  
(0.932) 
ΔTOBINS_Q 
  
0.719 
  
0.678 
   
(0.449) 
  
(0.442) 
ΔN_ANALYSTS 
  
-0.004 
  
-0.002 
   
(0.862) 
  
(0.923) 
Constant 0.698*** -1.560 -2.305*** 0.614*** -1.832 -2.246*** 
 
(0.000) (0.505) (0.000) (0.000) (0.434) (0.000) 
       
Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Cluster by Firm & Year No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,643 1,496 1,104 1,643 1,496 1,104 
R-squared 0.010 0.038 0.091 0.014 0.041 0.096 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0050 -0.0024 0.0304 0.0078 0.0005 0.0348 
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TABLE 6 
 
The Effects of Beating the Profit Benchmark on Customers’ Perceptions of Firms  
Conditional on the Firms’ Magnitude of Earnings 
Table 6 reports the results for the cross-sectional variation tests based on firms’ earnings magnitude. To test H2, we 
estimate equation (3) to examine the effects of firm’s earnings magnitude after beating the profit benchmark on 
customers’ perceptions. CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION is the dependent variable. Column (1) shows the regression 
results with the interaction term between the profit benchmark and actual earnings (PROFIT *EPS). Column (2)-(5) 
show the results for each subsample based on the quartiles of actual earnings after beating the profit benchmark (from 
EPS_0_25TH to EPS_75TH_ABOVE). Column (6) and (7) report the regression results for the subsamples when firms’ 
actual earnings are above 80th and 90th percentiles (EPS_80TH_ABOVE and EPS_90TH_ABOVE) after the profit 
benchmark. p-values in parentheses are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year.  All variables are 
defined in the Appendix. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
  Level of Profitability  
VARIABLES 
Interaction 
Term 
Low Moderate 
Moderate 
to High 
Relatively 
High 
High Very High 
        
PROFIT 2.567*** 
      
 
(0.000) 
      
EPS 2.552*** 
      
 
(0.000) 
      
PROFIT *EPS -21.395*** 
      
 
(0.001) 
      
EPS_0_25TH 
 
53.668** 
     
  
(0.048) 
     
EPS_25TH_50TH 
  
13.184 
    
   
(0.784) 
    
EPS_50TH_75TH 
   
3.460 
   
    
(0.905) 
   
EPS_75TH_ABOVE 
    
-21.266*** 
  
     
(0.000) 
  
EPS_80TH_ABOVE 
     
-22.659*** 
 
      
(0.000) 
 
EPS_90TH_ABOVE 
      
-25.085*** 
       
(0.001) 
SIZE -0.797*** -0.591 -1.020* -0.713 -1.602*** -1.494*** -1.338** 
 
(0.006) (0.348) (0.053) (0.108) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) 
LEV 1.263 2.977* -0.774 0.824 4.134** 2.908 3.888 
 
(0.261) (0.082) (0.625) (0.601) (0.019) (0.114) (0.140) 
        
      (Continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
 
  
BTM -0.393 -0.527 0.764 3.911** -1.266 -1.501 -2.357 
 (0.632) (0.542) (0.503) (0.028) (0.385) (0.288) (0.206) 
RD_EXP 2.485 26.030*** -5.997 5.933 -19.080 -19.901 -13.267 
 
(0.828) (0.002) (0.713) (0.777) (0.114) (0.200) (0.617) 
ADS_EXP 14.593 24.186*** -0.448 41.925*** 8.170 -5.824 -15.411 
 
(0.128) (0.000) (0.969) (0.007) (0.712) (0.849) (0.780) 
FIRM_AGE 0.767 0.988** 1.417** 1.652** -0.072 -0.402 -1.075 
 
(0.106) (0.041) (0.021) (0.018) (0.878) (0.458) (0.239) 
SALES_GROWTH 2.567*** 1.198 4.600 0.404 7.806** 7.220** 6.834** 
 
(0.008) (0.675) (0.116) (0.910) (0.028) (0.037) (0.036) 
CSR_SCORE 0.336*** 0.153 0.262*** 0.356*** 0.449*** 0.403*** 0.182 
 
(0.000) (0.157) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.186) 
PRODUCT_QUALITY 1.202*** 1.822*** 1.316*** 1.552*** 0.589* 1.145** 1.220* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.075) (0.031) (0.083) 
ROA -5.771 -36.151** -12.599 -14.149 0.200 -3.779 -13.001 
 
(0.258) (0.021) (0.468) (0.423) (0.986) (0.754) (0.268) 
HERF_INDEX -3.937 -18.353 -3.001 8.731 -0.866 68.232*** 247.110 
 
(0.604) (0.163) (0.704) (0.269) (0.975) (0.003) (0.107) 
INDUS_ADJ_RET 0.353 -0.456 0.847 -1.339** 0.669 0.316 -0.299 
 
(0.237) (0.743) (0.428) (0.039) (0.312) (0.664) (0.807) 
N_INDSEG 0.315** 0.568* 0.353 0.467** 0.355 0.166 0.108 
 
(0.027) (0.052) (0.189) (0.048) (0.157) (0.561) (0.820) 
FIRM_REPUTATION 0.818** 1.524* 2.232*** -0.232 0.665 0.563 0.209 
 
(0.031) (0.076) (0.006) (0.643) (0.195) (0.312) (0.855) 
TOBINS_Q 0.627 3.246** 2.221 5.036** -6.164** -6.576*** -4.142 
 
(0.584) (0.016) (0.408) (0.025) (0.018) (0.008) (0.115) 
N_ANALYSTS 0.004 -0.009 0.075 -0.045 0.084** 0.108* 0.160 
 
(0.924) (0.885) (0.131) (0.496) (0.035) (0.098) (0.102) 
Constant 47.881*** 55.780*** 48.434*** 60.674*** 42.761*** 32.789*** 75.601* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) 
        
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm & Year Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,719 305 432 437 430 345 174 
R-squared 0.546 0.657 0.595 0.598 0.675 0.700 0.735 
Adjusted R-squared 0.523 0.563 0.511 0.523 0.619 0.637 0.622 
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TABLE 7 
 
The Effects of Beating Earnings Benchmark on Customers’ Perceptions of Firms 
Conditional on the Firms’ Life Cycle  
Table 7 presents the results for the cross-sectional variation tests based on firms’ life cycle. To test H3, we estimate 
equation (4) to discover the effects of beating the profit benchmark on customers’ perceptions in various stages 
of firms’ life cycle. CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION is the dependent variable. Column (1)-(5) shows the regression 
results with each individual life cycle of firms: Introduction (INTRODUCTION), Growth (GROWTH), Mature 
(MATURE), Shake-out (SHAKE_OUT), and Decline (DECLINE), and their respective interaction terms with the 
profit benchmark. Column (6) shows the overall regression results which put together of all the life cycle and 
interactions. p-values in parentheses are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year. All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
 Business Life Cycle 
VARIABLES Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out Decline All of Them 
       
PROFIT 1.605** 2.708*** 1.912** 1.762*** 1.361** 1.848*** 
 
(0.013) (0.001) (0.044) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) 
EPS 2.347*** 2.170*** 2.337*** 2.272*** 2.150*** 1.941*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INTRODUCTION -2.203*** 
    
-1.890** 
 
(0.000) 
    
(0.030) 
INTRODUCTION*PROFIT 1.941* 
    
2.118** 
 
(0.053) 
    
(0.015) 
GROWTH 
 
3.722*** 
   
2.706** 
  
(0.003) 
   
(0.047) 
GROWTH*PROFIT 
 
-2.716** 
   
-1.791 
  
(0.025) 
   
(0.164) 
MATURE 
  
-0.042 
   
   
(0.967) 
   
MATURE*PROFIT 
  
-0.284 
   
   
(0.788) 
   
SHAKE_OUT 
   
-1.694 
 
-1.915 
    
(0.487) 
 
(0.419) 
SHAKE_OUT*PROFIT 
   
0.523 
 
0.974 
    
(0.825) 
 
(0.674) 
DECLINE 
    
-4.375** -4.136** 
     
(0.027) (0.044) 
DECLINE*PROFIT 
    
11.155*** 10.976*** 
     
(0.001) (0.002) 
  (Continued on the next page)                    
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              TABLE 7 (Continued) 
 
 
SIZE -0.823*** -0.839*** -0.817*** -0.825*** -0.818*** -0.848*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
LEV 0.852 0.100 0.583 0.634 0.785 0.221 
 (0.457) (0.933) (0.621) (0.573) (0.482) (0.857) 
BTM -0.261 -0.375 -0.287 -0.261 -0.266 -0.323 
 (0.767) (0.655) (0.741) (0.754) (0.761) (0.698) 
RD_EXP 0.993 0.040 0.487 0.898 0.185 0.997 
 (0.931) (0.997) (0.967) (0.937) (0.987) (0.930) 
ADS_EXP 14.419 14.885 14.358 14.268 14.932 15.437 
 (0.124) (0.122) (0.127) (0.129) (0.102) (0.102) 
FIRM_AGE 0.772 0.800* 0.770 0.775 0.757 0.799* 
 (0.115) (0.079) (0.110) (0.109) (0.118) (0.078) 
SALES_GROWTH 2.664*** 2.320** 2.647*** 2.449** 2.486*** 1.985** 
 (0.003) (0.015) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.019) 
CSR_SCORE 0.337*** 0.342*** 0.337*** 0.336*** 0.341*** 0.344*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PRODUCT_QUALITY 1.221*** 1.234*** 1.233*** 1.189*** 1.242*** 1.223*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -14.062*** -14.198*** -13.254*** -13.534*** -13.364*** -14.302*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HERF_INDEX -4.723 -4.028 -4.620 -5.145 -5.282 -4.839 
 (0.548) (0.612) (0.558) (0.534) (0.497) (0.554) 
INDUS_ADJ_RET -0.444 -0.372 -0.444 -0.392 -0.372 -0.304 
 (0.134) (0.220) (0.123) (0.173) (0.239) (0.333) 
N_INDSEG 0.323** 0.333** 0.327** 0.331** 0.323** 0.332** 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) 
FIRM_REPUTATION 0.856** 0.867** 0.887** 0.798** 0.863** 0.819** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.042) (0.029) (0.041) 
TOBINS_Q 1.861* 1.881* 1.837* 1.778* 1.819* 1.876* 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.084) (0.078) (0.073) 
N_ANALYST 0.010 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.006 
 (0.816) (0.897) (0.872) (0.789) (0.901) (0.895) 
CONSTANT 48.143*** 47.468*** 48.196*** 48.263*** 48.853*** 48.698*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm & Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 1,719 
R-squared 0.540 0.544 0.539 0.541 0.543 0.548 
Adjusted R-squared 0.516 0.520 0.515 0.517 0.519 0.523 
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TABLE 8 
  
The Effects of Beating Earnings Benchmark on Customers’ Perceptions of Firms 
Conditional on the Firms’ Industry Characteristics and Financial Default Risk  
 
Table 8 Panel A presents the results for the cross-sectional variation tests which focus on the firms’ industry 
characteristics. To test H4, we divide the sample into industry-type subsamples to examine whether the effect 
of beating earnings benchmark on customers’ perceptions of firms differs among three industry characteristics. 
Specifically, CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION is the dependent variable. Column (1)-(2), Column (3)-(4), 
Column (5)-(6) show the subsample regression results based on whether a firm is in the durable goods 
industries, the goods-oriented (vs. service-oriented) industries, or industries in which firms produce long-term 
products, respectively. p-values in parentheses are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year.  
All variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: The Perception Effect Conditional on Firms’ Industry Types  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
VARIABLES 
Durable 
Goods 
Industries 
Non-
Durable 
Goods 
Industries 
Goods- 
Oriented 
Industries 
Service- 
Oriented 
Industries 
Long-Term 
Product 
(LTP) 
Industries 
Non 
LTP 
Industries 
       
PROFIT 3.126*** 1.039 2.517** 0.928 2.062** 1.640 
 
(0.009) (0.188) (0.030) (0.357) (0.048) (0.117) 
EPS -2.688 2.299*** -4.743 2.441*** 2.412*** 0.178 
 
(0.357) (0.000) (0.350) (0.000) (0.000) (0.968) 
SIZE -0.254 -1.158*** -1.041** -0.722* -0.607 -1.157*** 
 
(0.586) (0.001) (0.014) (0.052) (0.159) (0.002) 
LEV 1.676 0.530 2.368 -0.353 -0.486 1.258 
 
(0.224) (0.709) (0.144) (0.825) (0.796) (0.294) 
BTM 1.221 -0.351 2.306* -1.119 -0.522 -0.226 
 
(0.257) (0.755) (0.068) (0.309) (0.658) (0.843) 
RD_EXP -1.234 14.092 -19.043 37.763*** -1.392 7.861 
 
(0.911) (0.580) (0.120) (0.004) (0.931) (0.562) 
ADS_EXP 8.057 25.072* 14.990 6.283 0.127 33.422** 
 
(0.724) (0.057) (0.194) (0.677) (0.994) (0.014) 
FIRM_AGE 0.980** 0.690 -0.008 1.580*** 1.028* 0.456 
 
(0.013) (0.269) (0.990) (0.004) (0.095) (0.462) 
SALES_GROWTH 3.011 2.043* 2.049 3.052*** 3.449** 1.714 
 
(0.180) (0.091) (0.268) (0.004) (0.015) (0.338) 
       
 
   (Continued on the next page)                    
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   TABLE 8   
    Panel A (Continued) 
 
 
 
CSR_SCORE 0.156*     0.463*** 0.527*** 0.140 0.194** 0.440*** 
 
(0.088)     (0.000) (0.000) (0.144) (0.042) (0.000) 
ROA -7.580 -14.546*** -8.948 -9.295 -19.993*** -6.380 
 
(0.263) (0.007) (0.283) (0.106) (0.000) (0.354) 
HERF_INDEX -4.653 -3.650 -34.988*** 7.185 2.826 -10.591 
 
(0.664) (0.787) (0.003) (0.270) (0.703) (0.505) 
INDUS_ADJ_RET -0.067 -0.759 0.649 -1.001* -0.819 0.233 
 (0.897) (0.338) (0.269) (0.054) (0.121) (0.700) 
N_INDSEG 0.021 0.509*** 0.327 0.460* 0.381 0.410** 
 (0.923) (0.004) (0.107) (0.055) (0.123) (0.017) 
FIRM_REPUTATION 1.105* 0.565 0.581 0.939 1.177 0.753 
 (0.061) (0.281) (0.248) (0.143) (0.125) (0.154) 
TOBINS_Q 3.351*** 0.687 1.380 1.411 3.188** 0.146 
 (0.003) (0.599) (0.236) (0.326) (0.029) (0.896) 
N_ANALYST 0.006 0.005 -0.038 0.045 0.043 -0.022 
 (0.901) (0.930) (0.570) (0.267) (0.240) (0.746) 
CONSTANT 41.770*** 52.897*** 65.032*** 60.521*** 54.643*** 56.135*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm & Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations    568 1,151  729            990    755                     964 
R-squared    0.457 0.556     0.603            0.501        0.550           0.556 
Adjusted R-squared    0.411 0.528     0.573            0.469                 0.518           0.533 
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TABLE 8 (Continued) 
  
Table 8 Panel B presents the results for the cross-sectional variation tests which focus on the firms’ 
financial default risk. To test H5, we examine whether the effect of beating earnings benchmark on 
customers’ perceptions varies among firms’ financial leverage, distress and volatility conditions, and we 
partition the sample accordingly. Specifically, CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION is the dependent variable. 
Column (1)-(2), Column (3)-(4), Column (5)-(6) show the subsample regression results based on firms’ 
level of the debt to assets ratio, the financial distress, or the stock volatility, respectively. p-values in 
parentheses are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel B: The Perception Effect Conditional on Firm’s Financial Default Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
VARIABLES 
High Debt 
to Assets 
Low Debt 
to Assets 
High 
Financial 
Distress 
Low 
Financial 
Distress 
High Stock 
Volatility 
Low Stock 
Volatility 
       
PROFIT 2.165** 0.818 1.908** 1.051 2.276*** 1.403 
 
(0.019) (0.480) (0.021) (0.481) (0.004) (0.221) 
EPS 2.777*** -16.921** -1.573 2.553*** 2.162*** -15.883* 
 
(0.000) (0.032) (0.579) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) 
SIZE -0.315 -0.942*** -0.496 -0.999*** -1.027*** -0.805** 
 
(0.376) (0.007) (0.322) (0.008) (0.003) (0.016) 
LEV 0.211 -0.495 -0.196 3.233*** 1.245 0.780 
 
(0.901) (0.800) (0.934) (0.002) (0.313) (0.624) 
BTM -0.843 1.940 2.904*** -2.126** -0.610 1.120 
 
(0.385) (0.393) (0.010) (0.023) (0.494) (0.453) 
RD_EXP -5.574 -11.044 -30.899*** 17.272 -1.070 -7.756 
 
(0.644) (0.375) (0.003) (0.199) (0.935) (0.536) 
ADS_EXP 23.016** 7.529 43.394** 9.575 22.862*** 8.456 
 
(0.012) (0.493) (0.031) (0.342) (0.003) (0.567) 
FIRM_AGE 0.820* 0.556 1.133* 0.295 0.486 0.771 
 
(0.069) (0.475) (0.082) (0.506) (0.338) (0.160) 
SALES_GROWTH 4.361*** 0.982 2.383* 3.606*** 3.064** 3.251* 
 
(0.008) (0.600) (0.061) (0.002) (0.031) (0.056) 
CSR_SCORE 0.150* 0.517*** 0.257*** 0.320*** 0.290*** 0.381*** 
 
(0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
PRODUCT_QUALITY 1.328*** 1.029*** 1.007*** 0.983*** 1.496*** 0.899** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.035) 
ROA -18.313*** 5.578 -10.532 -6.117 -17.972*** 4.821 
 
(0.000) (0.503) (0.205) (0.441) (0.000) (0.576) 
       
    (Continued on the next page) 
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TABLE 8 
 Panel B (Continued) 
 
       
HERF_INDEX 0.389 -13.503* -12.690 -3.384 5.174 -6.112 
 (0.930) (0.090) (0.229) (0.747) (0.749) (0.440) 
INDUS_ADJ_RET -0.868*** 0.740 0.919*** -1.308** -0.410 1.061 
 
(0.009) (0.187) (0.009) (0.023) (0.164) (0.195) 
N_INDSEG 0.126 0.447** 0.081 0.404*** 0.325 0.297* 
 
(0.447) (0.033) (0.667) (0.007) (0.142) (0.098) 
FIRM_REPUTATION 0.678 0.539 0.860 0.919 1.416** 0.303 
 
(0.214) (0.302) (0.129) (0.111) (0.014) (0.563) 
TOBINS_Q 3.257*** 0.467 6.149*** 0.358 0.834 1.257 
 
(0.006) (0.783) (0.000) (0.739) (0.527) (0.332) 
N_ANALYST -0.054 0.030 -0.038 -0.014 0.088* -0.088** 
 
(0.124) (0.575) (0.308) (0.750) (0.077) (0.031) 
CONSTANT 67.885*** 54.185*** 56.723*** 49.630*** 58.431*** 49.527*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
Industry and Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm & Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 860 859 734 985 857 862 
R-squared 0.643 0.541 0.539 0.652 0.548 0.599 
Adjusted R-squared 0.609 0.498 0.492 0.623 0.502 0.562 
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TABLE 9 
  
The Effects of Beating Earnings Benchmark on Customers’ Perceptions of Firms 
Conditional on the Firms’ Product Quality, Influence (Reputation) and CSR Engagements 
 
Table 9 Panel A reports the results for the cross-sectional variation tests conditional on the firms’ product 
quality. To test H6, we examine whether the effect of beating earnings benchmark on customers’ perceptions 
differs among the various quality of firms’ products, based on which we use to divide the sample into 
subsamples. CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION is the dependent variable. Column (1)-(2), Column (3)-(4), 
Column (5)-(6) show the subsample regression results based on whether firms’ product quality is overall 
relatively ordinary, superior, or concerned, respectively. p-values in parentheses are calculated using standard 
errors clustered by firm and year.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Perception Effect Conditional on Firms’ Product Quality 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
 Product Quality 
VARIABLES 
Overall 
Ordinary 
Overall 
Superior/ 
Concerned 
Not 
Superior 
Superior  
Not 
Concerned 
Concerned 
       
PROFIT 2.153** 1.046 1.573** 1.173 3.388*** 1.084 
 
(0.015) (0.408) (0.043) (0.472) (0.010) (0.467) 
EPS 1.720*** 2.935*** 3.076*** 2.090*** 2.082 2.748*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.436) (0.000) 
SIZE -0.849*** -1.281** -1.195*** -0.153 -0.776*** -0.503 
 
(0.005) (0.033) (0.000) (0.764) (0.003) (0.260) 
LEV 0.449 1.961 0.475 0.583 1.313 0.277 
 
(0.751) (0.289) (0.723) (0.809) (0.172) (0.853) 
BTM 0.936 -0.950 -0.348 1.305 1.648** -1.335 
 
(0.329) (0.492) (0.690) (0.469) (0.020) (0.199) 
RD_EXP 10.674 -27.310** -4.660 5.116 1.105 10.997 
 
(0.433) (0.013) (0.730) (0.706) (0.910) (0.394) 
ADS_EXP 9.443 27.718** 4.421 49.939*** 4.401 49.299** 
 
(0.383) (0.034) (0.631) (0.007) (0.504) (0.027) 
FIRM_AGE 1.037* 0.303 0.397 1.478*** 0.579 1.561*** 
 
(0.060) (0.430) (0.416) (0.003) (0.143) (0.006) 
SALES_GROWTH 2.278** 4.502** 4.387*** 0.490 1.795*** 3.628** 
 
(0.037) (0.047) (0.000) (0.790) (0.007) (0.011) 
CSR_SCORE 0.308*** 0.394*** 0.353*** 0.262*** 0.274*** 0.369*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.005) (0.000) 
       
(Continued on the next page) 
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                                      TABLE 9 
                             Panel A (Continued) 
 
 
  
       
ROA -15.637*** -9.039* -20.455*** -2.579 -15.021** -12.926* 
 
(0.001) (0.092) (0.000) (0.719) (0.037) (0.064) 
HERF_INDEX 0.525 -25.131 -11.582 -11.712 -1.796 -26.433 
 
(0.926) (0.196) (0.243) (0.608) (0.516) (0.137) 
INDUS_ADJ_RET -0.614 -0.032 -0.780** 0.349 -0.250 -1.283*** 
 
(0.283) (0.967) (0.050) (0.616) (0.620) (0.002) 
N_INDSEG 0.311* 0.313* 0.246 0.110 0.097 0.294 
 
(0.054) (0.073) (0.145) (0.580) (0.482) (0.129) 
FIRM_REPUTATION 0.885** 0.945 0.961* 0.217 0.876** 1.058 
 
(0.032) (0.117) (0.076) (0.806) (0.044) (0.125) 
TOBINS_Q 3.303*** -0.313 2.882** 2.108 2.979*** 1.889 
 
(0.005) (0.842) (0.028) (0.132) (0.001) (0.181) 
N_ANALYST -0.023 0.025 0.038 -0.100* -0.031 -0.044 
 
(0.548) (0.685) (0.508) (0.053) (0.358) (0.352) 
CONSTANT 60.192*** 62.627*** 50.805*** 56.167*** 69.823*** 44.378*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm & Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,233 486 1,231 488 879 840 
R-squared 0.473 0.724 0.525 0.660 0.549 0.639 
Adjusted R-squared 0.436 0.681 0.492 0.608 0.504 0.607 
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Table 9 Panel B presents the results for the cross-sectional variation tests based on the firms’ influence (size), 
diversity, and reputation. To test H7, we partition the sample into corresponding subsamples, and we examine 
whether the effect of beating earnings benchmark on customers’ perceptions of firms depends on those 
mentioned firms’ features. Specifically, CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION is the dependent variable. Column (1)-
(2), Column (3)-(4), Column (5)-(6) show the subsample regression results conditional on whether a firm is 
influential (with large-size), a firm is diversified with multiple business segments, or a firm is highly reputable 
(i.e. being recognized as the American Most Admired (MA) company), respectively. p-values in parentheses 
are calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
          Panel B: Perception Effect Conditional on Firms’ Influence, Diversity, and Reputation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
VARIABLES 
Less 
Influential 
Firms 
Influential 
Firms 
Less 
Diversified 
Firms 
Diversified 
Firms 
Non-MA 
Firms 
MA 
Firms 
 
     
 
PROFIT 3.201*** 0.709 1.947*** 0.978 2.250*** 1.822 
 (0.000) (0.565) (0.009) (0.327) (0.003) (0.217) 
EPS -0.154 2.323*** 2.123*** 3.033*** 2.235*** -8.143 
 (0.971) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.263) 
SIZE -1.012** -1.556** -0.592* -0.543 -1.139*** -0.526 
 (0.023) (0.047) (0.087) (0.106) (0.001) (0.214) 
LEV 1.163 2.320 2.877** 1.095 0.896 1.739 
 (0.330) (0.203) (0.027) (0.488) (0.433) (0.282) 
BTM -0.019 -0.337 0.761 -0.263 0.103 -1.332 
 (0.981) (0.738) (0.459) (0.797) (0.926) (0.435) 
RD_EXP 1.924 -19.018* 1.121 20.234 -14.054 20.459 
 (0.837) (0.099) (0.932) (0.278) (0.100) (0.147) 
ADS_EXP 8.311 90.048*** -19.300 23.677** 5.449 25.473** 
 (0.265) (0.002) (0.105) (0.037) (0.555) (0.049) 
FIRM_AGE 0.762* 0.689 0.808* 0.196 0.035 1.393** 
 (0.098) (0.261) (0.083) (0.726) (0.941) (0.022) 
SALES_GROWTH 3.465*** 1.595 2.155 3.798*** 2.166*** 1.933 
 (0.000) (0.206) (0.236) (0.006) (0.004) (0.315) 
CSR_SCORE 0.211** 0.420*** 0.321*** 0.323*** 0.305*** 0.310*** 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
PRODUCT_QUALITY 1.662*** 1.171*** 0.762*** 1.142*** 1.280*** 1.080*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
       
(Continued on the next page) 
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ROA -16.103*** -11.625** -16.705*** -5.293 -20.221*** -0.699 
 (0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.358) (0.001) (0.928) 
HERF_INDEX -3.813 1.330 2.310 -19.858 -1.824 2.643 
 (0.668) (0.957) (0.821) (0.105) (0.755) (0.822) 
INDUS_ADJ_RET 0.026 -1.492** -0.020 -1.130*** -0.662 -0.128 
 (0.947) (0.036) (0.962) (0.007) (0.166) (0.859) 
N_INDSEG 0.071 0.457** -2.859*** 0.228 0.099 0.360* 
 (0.649) (0.041) (0.004) (0.261) (0.579) (0.065) 
TOBINS_Q 1.084 3.957** 1.266 2.317** 0.633 0.694 
 (0.303) (0.019) (0.285) (0.046) (0.596) (0.606) 
N_ANALYST 0.025 -0.003 -0.010 -0.015 -0.041 -0.006 
 (0.533) (0.954) (0.843) (0.723) (0.572) (0.878) 
FIRM_REPUTATION 1.710*** 0.105 0.860 0.508   
 (0.000) (0.859) (0.165) (0.401)   
Constant 47.307*** 68.295*** 46.255*** 56.405*** 65.332*** 35.293*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm & Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 856 863 602 1,117 755 964 
R-squared 0.520 0.598 0.637 0.597 0.555 0.627 
Adjusted R-squared 0.471 0.569 0.593 0.567 0.507 0.597 
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Table 9 Panel C reports the results for the cross-sectional variation tests based on the firms’ corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) engagements. To test H8, we examine whether the effect of beating earnings 
benchmark on customers’ perceptions of firms varies among firms’ different level of commitments to CSR 
activities, and we divide the sample into subsamples accordingly. CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION is the 
dependent variable. Column (1)-(2), Column (3)-(4), Column (5)-(6) show the subsample regression 
results based on whether a firm has good CSR ratings (KLD scores), discloses separate CSR reports, or 
has been included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), respectively. p-values in parentheses are 
calculated using standard errors clustered by firm and year.  All variables are defined in the Appendix. *, 
**, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
         Panel C: Perception Effect Conditional on Firms’ CSR Engagements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CUSTOMER_PERCEPTION 
VARIABLES 
Low CSR 
Score 
High CSR 
Score 
Non-CSR  
Disclosures 
CSR 
Disclosure 
Not included 
in DJSI  
Included 
in DJSI  
       
PROFIT 2.688*** 0.723 3.443*** 0.203 2.129*** 1.383 
 (0.003) (0.532) (0.000) (0.844) (0.008) (0.358) 
EPS 2.502*** 2.012*** 2.097*** -3.484*** 2.330*** 1.463 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.752) 
SIZE -1.215*** -0.237 -0.794* -0.452 -1.026*** 0.297 
 (0.000) (0.564) (0.068) (0.214) (0.002) (0.598) 
LEV 1.318 -0.230 0.933 0.445 1.545 -1.071 
 (0.323) (0.861) (0.484) (0.795) (0.166) (0.627) 
BTM -0.179 0.279 -0.487 1.585** -0.129 0.275 
 (0.838) (0.672) (0.633) (0.046) (0.906) (0.792) 
RD_EXP 9.316 -9.104 9.607 -23.751** -6.516 -4.048 
 (0.667) (0.364) (0.395) (0.033) (0.591) (0.827) 
ADS_EXP 16.566 15.661* 3.909 21.102 5.243 42.667*** 
 (0.283) (0.082) (0.733) (0.110) (0.594) (0.003) 
FIRM_AGE 0.555 1.132** 0.934* 0.880* 0.415 1.835** 
 (0.271) (0.018) (0.082) (0.054) (0.296) (0.014) 
SALES_GROWTH 3.018*** 3.691** 1.073 3.833 3.180*** 1.781 
 (0.001) (0.047) (0.263) (0.130) (0.010) (0.633) 
CSR_SCORE 0.534*** 0.294*** 0.300*** 0.463*** 0.355*** 0.328*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
PRODUCT_QUALITY 1.478*** 1.026*** 1.123*** 1.145*** 1.052*** 1.314*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
ROA -28.413*** 1.414 -23.795*** 9.515* -21.220*** 1.769 
 (0.000) (0.736) (0.000) (0.077) (0.000) (0.606) 
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HERF_INDEX -1.011 -13.682 -3.903 -29.052*** 1.405 -16.845 
 (0.904) (0.119) (0.615) (0.008) (0.863) (0.393) 
INDUS_ADJ_RET -0.276 -1.178** -0.612 0.255 -0.390 -0.678* 
 (0.521) (0.025) (0.207) (0.617) (0.470) (0.064) 
N_INDSEG 0.307 0.403** 0.402* 0.038 0.260* 0.474* 
 (0.125) (0.020) (0.051) (0.845) (0.069) (0.077) 
FIRM_REPUTATION 1.625*** 0.636 1.185** 0.528 1.205** -0.658 
 (0.005) (0.208) (0.044) (0.146) (0.011) (0.325) 
TOBINS_Q 2.435** 1.721* 2.830** 0.538 2.050* 2.562* 
 (0.027) (0.097) (0.013) (0.639) (0.077) (0.062) 
N_ANALYST 0.063 -0.036 0.017 -0.000 0.015 -0.022 
 (0.364) (0.284) (0.742) (0.998) (0.775) (0.682) 
Constant 48.426*** 46.722*** 40.300*** 58.120*** 48.561*** 43.940*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
Industry & Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster by Firm & 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 870 849 952 767 1,200 519 
R-squared 0.560 0.575 0.558 0.636 0.567 0.668 
Adjusted R-squared 0.516 0.536 0.520 0.598 0.535 0.623 
 
 
